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The Azerbaijan State Veterinary Control Service (SVCS) has conducted active serological
surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in poultry since 2006, when the first outbreak
of AI H5N1 occurred in Azerbaijan. Samples are collected from September to May
annually and tested using a hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay to detect antibodies
against H5 AI viruses. HI testing is also performed for Newcastle disease virus (NDV)
upon request, but since this method cannot distinguish between natural infections and
immune responses to vaccination, all positive results require follow-up epidemiological
investigations. Furthermore, blood collection for the surveillance program is time-
intensive and can be stressful to birds. In order to improve the national surveillance
program, alternative sampling and testing methodologies were applied among a
population of birds in the Barda region and compared with results of the national
surveillance program. Tracheal and cloacal swabs were collected instead of blood.
Rather than testing individual samples, RNA was pooled to conserve resources and
time, and pools were tested by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction
(rRT-PCR). Environmental sampling at a live bird market was also introduced as another
surveillance mechanism. A total of 1,030 swabs were collected, comprising tracheal,
and cloacal samples from 441 birds and 148 environmental surface samples from farms
or the live bird market. During the same time, 3,890 blood samples were collected
nationally for the surveillance program; 400 of these samples originated in the Barda
region. Birds sampled for rRT-PCR were likely different than those tested as part of
national surveillance. All swab samples tested negative by rRT-PCR for both AI and NDV.
All blood samples tested negative for H5 by HI, while 6.2% of all samples and 5% of
the Barda samples tested positive for exposure to NDV. Follow-up investigations found
that positive samples were from birds vaccinated in the previous month. This study
demonstrated that taking swabs was quicker and less invasive than blood collection.
Results of rRT-PCR testing were similar to HI testing for H5 but also ruled out infection
with all influenza type A viruses and not just H5. In addition, rRT-PCR testing was able
to rule out active infections with NDV.
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INTRODUCTION
Inﬂuenza A virus subtype H5N1, also known as highly
pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) or simply H5N1, is a virus that
infects birds and can cause serious illness and death in humans
(Liu et al., 2005; Alexander and Capua, 2009; Belser et al., 2011).
The ﬁrst case of human H5N1 was recorded in 1997 during a
poultry outbreak in Hong Kong. After its re-emergence in 2003
and 2004, the virus spread from Asia to Europe and Africa, where
it has since resulted in over 800 human infections and 400 deaths
(World Health Organization [WHO], 2005; Gilsdorf et al., 2006;
Belser et al., 2011). Migratory birds can spread H5N1 and other
avian viruses over long distances (OIE World Organization for
Animal Health, 2012). AI outbreaks in poultry have a negative
impact on livelihoods, local economies, and international trade
in aﬀected countries. The circulation of H5N1 in poultry also
threatens public health, since this strain has the potential to cause
serious disease in people and is capable of mutating into a form
that is more transmissible among humans, increasing the risk of
a pandemic and mass mortality event.
Inﬂuenza virus subtypes other than H5N1 that circulate in
poultry and other animals also pose a threat to public health.
For example, inﬂuenza A viruses of the H7 hemagglutinin type
can be highly pathogenic in birds and must be reported to the
OIE World Organization for Animal Health (2012) when they
are detected. H7 AI viruses are also known to infect humans.
A novel H7N9 virus emerged in 2013 that has caused a total of
571 laboratory-conﬁrmed infections and 212 deaths to date as of
February 23, 2015 (World Health Organization [WHO], 2015).
H9 viruses also can cause infections in birds and people (Lin
et al., 2000; Iqbal et al., 2009; Poovorawan et al., 2013). An H9N2
viruse identiﬁed in poultry has been found to be responsible for
contributing six genes to the H7N9 inﬂuenza virus that emerged
in 2013 and is known to be pathogenic in people (Pu et al., 2014).
Newcastle disease (ND) is a highly contagious viral avian
disease that is a diﬀerential diagnosis for HPAI as it causes clinical
symptoms similar to those of HPAI, including damage to the
respiratory, intestinal, and nervous systems of infected birds. ND
has been classiﬁed by the OIE as an especially dangerous disease
(Group A) on account of its ability to adversely aﬀect the health
of large populations of birds. Newcastle disease virus (NDV), the
causative agent of ND, is known to infect over 200 species of birds
(World Organization for Animal Health, 2008). The severity of
disease varies by host species and strain of virus; the fatality rate
in birds infected with NDV has reached 100% in past outbreaks
(Agayeva and Zeynalova, 2011). In recent years, the reported
incidence of ND has increased worldwide; outbreaks have been
detected in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa (Gilsdorf et al.,
2006).
Azerbaijan has recorded outbreaks of both viruses in poultry,
most recently in 2006. In February 2006, H5N1 AI was ﬁrst
identiﬁed in Azerbaijan among wild birds along the coast of
the Caspian Sea near Baku. Later that month, infections were
detected in poultry on farms in the northeastern and southern
regions of the country. The ﬁrst cases of human H5N1 infection
were recorded in March, and by December 2006 the disease
had spread throughout Azerbaijan, resulting in eight conﬁrmed
human cases, ﬁve of which were fatal. The outbreaks were
ultimately traced to wild birds and domestic poultry in the
Gilazi and Bilasuvar rayons (Agayeva and Zeynalova, 2011; Belser
et al., 2011). Two outbreaks of NDV were also recorded in 2006
(Agayeva and Zeynalova, 2011).
Following the 2006 outbreak of H5N1, the Azerbaijan State
Veterinary Control Service (SVCS) initiated active serological
monitoring for AI in poultry. Azerbaijan has a total of
approximately 17 million poultry, of which about 70% are
privately owned and 30% are commercially owned. The majority
of poultry are considered village or backyard poultry as
categorized by the FAO deﬁnition of poultry production systems
(Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2004). Under the
SVCS program, blood samples from poultry are tested for the
presence of antibodies against H5 by the hemagglutination
inhibition (HI) assay using OIE-standardized reagents. Twelve
Zonal Veterinary Laboratories (ZVLs) and Regional Veterinary
Oﬃces in Azerbaijan are engaged in this surveillance program.
Sample collection from domestic birds occurs between September
and May each year and testing is performed at the Republican
Veterinary Laboratory (RVL). When the Regional Veterinary
Oﬃces submit samples for H5 testing, they may also request ND
disease testing, which is performed byHI using OIE-standardized
reagents. ND testing is requested for approximately half of the
samples submitted.
The study described herein was undertaken to investigate
sampling and testing methodologies that might be better
alternatives to those currently deployed for AI and ND
serosurveillance in Azerbaijan. HI testing of HPAI is subtype-
speciﬁc, but the current surveillance system only tests for H5
viruses (State Veterinary Control Service, 2013), and therefore
will fail to detect immune responses to other subtypes (including
known human-pathogenic strains such as H7 and H9). In
addition, HI testing requires blood samples, which are time-
intensive and more invasive to collect than other types of
biological samples (such as tracheal and cloacal swabs).
The speciﬁc goals of this study were to use rRT-PCR to test
tracheal and cloacal swab samples for AI and ND viral RNA; to
screen samples for the inﬂuenza A matrix gene so as to detect
all subtypes known to be pathogenic to humans; to implement
sample pooling as a way to reduce the costs of testing; and to
introduce environmental sampling in live bird markets as a way
to increase the chances of detecting disease in an area where
species of birds from many locations are commingled. The OIE
Terrestrial Manual states that while virus culture is the “gold
standard” diagnostic test for identifying virus, culture is laborious
and time insensitive. Real-time RT-PCR is the diagnostic method
of choice in many laboratories for identifying the presence of
antigen (OIE World Organization for Animal Health, 2012).
Several studies have shown the rRT-PCR has been shown to have
the added beneﬁt of being able to pool samples as a way to save
money on reagents for both AI and ND testing (Fereidouni et al.,
2012; Spackman et al., 2013). Live bird markets have long been
known to be a source of inﬂuenza and NDVs. Inﬂuenza A H5,
H7, and H9 viruses, which can aﬀect both poultry and people,
have all been identiﬁed in poultry or the environment of live bird
markets (Liu et al., 2003; Ge et al., 2009; Wan et al., 2011; Lee
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et al., 2013; Waziri et al., 2014). NDV has also been identiﬁed
in live bird markets (Jibril et al., 2014; Mulisa et al., 2014).
Environmental sampling of live bird markets has been shown to
be an eﬀective way to assess inﬂuenza contamination (Indriani
et al., 2010). In one study, PCR of environmental samples was a
more eﬀective method for identifying the presence of inﬂuenza
virus contamination than viral culture (Horm et al., 2013).
In order to investigate sampling and testing methodologies
that might be better alternatives or supplements to those methods
currently deployed for AI and ND serosurveillance in Azerbaijan,
domestic poultry were sampled between September 2013 and
April 2014 using new methodologies aimed at detecting the
presence of antigen. The results of testing were compared with
results of the ongoing national surveillance aimed at detecting
immune response against AI A H5 viruses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Site Selection
Project activities were centered in Barda, a region with a
documented history ofH5N1 andND cases in birds (Agayeva and
Zeynalova, 2011). The region is regularly exposed to migratory
birds because it is situated between the Mingechevir water
reservoir to the north and the Goygol and Agh Gol National
Parks to the west and the southeast, respectively. According to
the Azerbaijan Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, these
areas comprise part of the migratory ﬂyway for several wild
bird species. Moreover, Barda city hosts the largest live animal
market in Azerbaijan. Finally, of all the rayons participating in the
SVCS surveillance program for AI, Barda historically generates
the most samples and routinely requests the most ND testing.
Project investigators conducted an initial sample collection
trip in May 2013, followed by eight more collection trips between
September 2013 andApril 2014. Samples were collected at the live
bird market in Barda city during each of the nine collection trips.
In addition, samples were collected from farms or households
in 17 of 110 villages and Barda city. To randomly select villages
for sampling, every village in the Barda rayon was assigned a
number, and numbers were randomly selected from this list
using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel. To identify farms
for sampling, investigators would randomly choose one of four
directions from the center of each selected village by spinning
a bottle from the center and choosing the direction that the
bottle pointed in. Every other farm or household was selected in
the chosen direction, up to a total of three farms or households
with poultry. If fewer than three farms or households existed
in a given direction within the boundaries of a village, another
direction was chosen randomly to continue the study. The geo-
coordinates (latitude and longitude) of the farms/households and
market where sampling occurred were captured using an eTrex10
GPS unit (Garmin, Olathe, KS, USA) and recorded in an Excel
spreadsheet.
Sample Collection
Samples for testing by rRT-PCR were collected from domestic
birds (ducks, geese, turkeys, and chickens) found at the selected
farms/households from Sector 4 production systems (village or
backyard poultry with minimal biosecurity and birds consumed
locally) as categorized by the Food and Agriculture Organization
[FAO] (2004). At the live bird market, the collection teams
solicited the voluntary participation of poultry vendors during six
site visits. Cloacal and tracheal samples were collected from each
of the birds enrolled in this study (Figure 1). Cloacal sampling
was performed by gently inserting a sterile cotton-tipped swab
(Puritan, Inc., Guilford, ME, USA) approximately 1 cm into the
vent. The tip of the swab was rolled along the interior surface
of the cloaca before it was removed and placed into a sterile
conical tube for transport to the laboratory. To collect tracheal
samples, a sterile cotton-tipped swab was inserted as deeply as
practicable into the oropharynx of the bird being tested. The
investigators made a special eﬀort to bring the sterile swab in
contact with the trachea and not simply the back of the oral
cavity. The swab was withdrawn and placed into a sterile conical
tube without media for transport to the laboratory. During
the collection procedures, the birds were restrained manually
without sedation, anesthesia, or other medications. Sampling
activities were conducted according to SVCS guidelines which are
the same as the (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2006)
guidelines and no birds were injured during collection.
Environmental swabs were collected in areas where birds were
held while awaiting sale at the live bird market. A dry, sterile,
cotton-tipped swab without media was used to swab cages, tables,
and wooden boards contaminated with the excretions of caged
birds. Each sample, regardless of its source, was placed into an
individual sterile conical tube to avoid any cross-contamination
that could confound the results of the diagnostic testing. All
samples were transported to the Barda ZVL on ice on the day of
collection, where they were stored at –20◦C pending transport to
the RVL in Baku for testing at the end of the sampling period.
Sample size was calculated to estimate the prevalence of AI
in poultry in the Barda region considering all poultry as one
population due to the minimal biosecurity in place for backyard
farms and the live poultry market. As the actual prevalence of
FIGURE 1 | Collecting swab samples from birds at Kelenterli village.
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AI or ND in this population was not known, the investigators
assumed a prevalence of 50% to conservatively determine the
appropriate sample size. From this assumption, the minimum
number of birds to sample was estimated to be 385 (with a 95%
conﬁdence interval and 5% allowable error). Sample size was
calculated using WinEpiscope 2.0 (Thrusﬁeld et al., 2001). All
birds available at a selected farm were swabbed, which on average
was approximately four birds per farm.
This project was conducted with approval by the Azerbaijan
State Veterinary Control Service (SVCS) Scientiﬁc Committee,
which reviewed the project proposal for scientiﬁc and ethical
concerns, including the use of animals. This work was funded
through a grant from the Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program (CBEP); the Medical Research and Materiel Command
(MRMC) Animal Care and Use Review Oﬃce (ACURO)
determined that the protocols described surveillance methods,
and therefore Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee
(IACUC) oversight was unnecessary. Additionally, bird sampling
procedures were deemed to cause less stress to the birds than
those normally conducted as part of the national surveillance
for H5 AI viruses. No birds were harmed during any part of
the sampling associated with this project. All sample collection
activities were completed in accordance with appropriate
biosafety procedures. Participants donned appropriate personal
protective equipment for the collection process, including
disposable gowns, gloves, hair nets, goggles, N95 respirators, and
shoe covers.
Sample Management and Preparation
Each sample was systematically assigned a unique identiﬁcation
number at the time of collection to facilitate matching of tracheal
and cloacal swabs collected from the same bird. A record sheet
was created to track the samples. The information captured
on the specimen records included the sample identiﬁcation
number, species sampled (turkey, ducks, geese, chickens), and
sample origin (i.e., cloaca, trachea, or environmental surface).
If the bird had any outward clinical signs of illness such
as discharge or diarrhea, this was also noted. The samples
were shipped on ice to the RVL at the end of each monthly
collection trip; total transit time between Barda and Baku
is approximately 4 h. Upon arrival at the RVL, the samples
were stored at –20◦C pending RNA extraction, which typically
occurred within 1 week of sample arrival. Each sample was
extracted individually and then pooled for viral RNA testing with
rRT-PCR.
Real-time RT-PCR Analysis
All 1,030 samples collected for rRT-PCR were extracted using
the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Inc., Gaithersburg,
MD,USA) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. After the
RNAwas extracted from individual samples, a portion of the viral
RNA from up to ﬁve samples of the same epidemiological unit
and sample type was pooled. A total of 213 pools were created
from the samples collected over the course of the project.
Real-time RT-PCR ampliﬁcation was performed using
the SuperScript II One-Step RT-PCR System (Invitrogen
Inc., Carlsbad, CA, USA); primer/probe sets (Sigma–Aldrich
Inc., Germany); and a Lightcycler 2.0 instrument (Roche
Diagnostics, Indianapolis, IN, USA). Invitrogen Platinum Taq
DNA polymerase kits (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA, USA)
were used to prepare the master mix for each pathogen (inﬂuenza
A virus or NDV). Real-time RT-PCR testing for a conserved
region of the inﬂuenza A matrix gene was used to screen samples
generically for all inﬂuenza A virus (AIV) strains (Spackman
et al., 2002). Real-time RT-PCR testing for the Fusion gene was
conducted to detect NDV as previously described (Wise et al.,
2004; Alexander and Capua, 2009). The speciﬁc forward and
reverse primers used for testing both AIV and NDV are shown
in Table 1. A total of 4 µL of extracted pooled RNA was used
in each 20 µL reaction. Positive and negative controls were
included in each run and each sample was run in duplicate. Had
any samples tested positive for the AIV matrix gene, H5, H7,
and/or H9 subtype-speciﬁc primers and probes would have been
used to characterize the virus subtype.
National Active Surveillance and
Vaccination Program for AI H5 and ND
Since 2006, the Azerbaijan SVCS has conducted an annual
serosurveillance program in which all 12 regional ZVLs
participate (Table 2). Each ZVL is responsible for collecting
samples from 4 to 5 rayons to ensure that surveillance
occurs throughout the country. Field veterinarians collect serum
samples from domestic fowl, and tissue samples are collected
from dead wild birds in Azerbaijan’s national parks and nature
reserves. Veterinarians submit collected samples to the local ZVL,
which in turn sends them to RVL for testing. Testing for AI H5
TABLE 1 | Primer/probe sequences and target pathogens and genomes.
Primer/Probe Sequence∗ Pathogen target Genome target
Influenza A virus
AI gene M forward primer 5′ AGATGAGTCTTCTAACCGAGGTCG 3′ AIV Matrix
AI gene M reverse primer 5′ TGCAAAAACATCTTCAAGTCTCTG 3′
Probe AI gene M FAM-TCAGGCCCCCTCAAAGCCGA –TAMRA
Newcastle disease virus
Forward primer 5′ GGTGAGTCTATCCGGARGATACAAG 3′ NDV Fusion
Reverse primer 5′ AGCTGTTGCAACCCCAAG 3′
Probe 5′ [FAM]AAGCGTTTCTGTCTCCTTCCTCCA [BHQ] 3′
∗Fluorescent dye abbreviations: 6FAM, 6-Carboxyfluorescein; TAMRA, tetramethylrhodamine; BHQ1 = Black Hole Quencher R© -1.
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TABLE 2 | Total number of samples tested for avian influenza and
Newcastle disease viruses during active surveillance from 2011 to 2014.
Year Domestic poultry
blood tested for
H5
Wild bird
internal organs
tested for H5
Domestic poultry
blood tested for
NDV
2011 8,752 110 4,020
2012 6,192 79 3,000
2013 7,353 18 3,700
2014 7,074 127 4,000
(and ND, when requested) is conducted by the SVCS according to
standard HI protocols (Alexander and Capua, 2009; OIE World
Organization for Animal Health, 2012).
The SVCS conducts an annual vaccination program against
ND using two live lentogenic virus vaccines, including H and
LaSota vaccines. No vaccination is conducted for AI.
RESULTS
Sample Collection
Overall, 1,030 swab samples were collected from birds and the
environment for testing by rRT-PCR over nine sampling events
(one event each in May, September, October, November, and
December 2013, and January and April 2014; two events inMarch
2014). A total of 441 birds were sampled including chickens
(n = 341), turkeys (n = 54), geese (n = 24), and ducks (n = 22).
Of the 441 birds sampled, 89 were from the live market while
352 were from private farms in the 17 villages and the city of
Barda (Figure 2). Of 441 birds sampled, 301 (68%) of these
birds had been previously vaccinated against ND with either
the LaSota or the H vaccine. One bird exhibited nasal discharge
at the time of sampling; all other birds were clinically healthy.
The investigators also collected 134 environmental swabs from
the live bird market and 14 environmental samples from farms
(Table 3).
Real-time RT-PCR Analysis
A total of 213 RNA pools were tested for NDV and for the
inﬂuenza A virus matrix gene by rRT-PCR. None of the pooled
samples were positive for either of the agents (Table 4). No
speciﬁc subtype testing for H5, H7, or H9 was necessary.
National Active Surveillance and
Vaccination Program for AI H5 and ND
Between September 2013 andMay 2014, the national surveillance
program collected a total of 3,890 samples for AI virus testing
throughout Azerbaijan; 400 of these originated from domestic
birds in the Barda region, but were likely diﬀerent than those
collected for rRT-PCR testing. None of the 3,890 samples were
positive for H5 AIV by the HI assay. A total of 240 samples (6.2%)
were positive for NDV overall; 20 (5%) of the 400 samples from
Barda were positive. According to 2014 SVCS data, 19,631,361
domestic birds were inoculated against NDV with the H vaccine
and 18,639,580 birds were vaccinated with the LaSota vaccine.
FIGURE 2 | Red circles indicate sampling sites in the Barda region of
Azerbaijan.
DISCUSSION
The results from the rRT-PCR testing conducted in this study
aligned with the results of the SVCS HI testing program for
H5, which has not detected any birds infected with AI H5 since
2006. The rRT-PCR test used in this study targeted the inﬂuenza
matrix A gene. Because this gene is common to all inﬂuenza A
viruses, it can be used to screen for several diﬀerent strains of
inﬂuenza type A viruses. A positive result on the rRT-PCR assay
for the matrix gene would be an indication for additional testing
to identify the speciﬁc inﬂuenza strain present in the sample. The
AI HI assay only detects AI H5 and does not test for the presence
of other hemagglutinin types. Although the results appear to
be consistent, a direct comparison between the results was not
possible because the samples collected in the national surveillance
program and the Barda study were not from the same birds.
Regardless, the failure of two diﬀerent testing strategies to detect
H5 suggests that this strain of AIV is not present in the Barda
region.
This study showed that real-time rRT-PCR testing could be a
valuable addition to the national surveillance program. Among
the samples from Barda that SVCS tested for NDV, 5% had
detectable antibodies. The detection of antibodies indicates that
the birds were exposed to NDV antigen either through natural
infection or exposure to a vaccine that triggered an immune
response detectable by serology testing. The SVCS vaccinates
birds annually with live lentogenic virus vaccines, and a positive
serology test result would not be unexpected. No large-scale
die-oﬀs or symptoms consistent with NDV were reported in
Azerbaijan during the surveillance period. Coupled with the lack
of positive rRT-PCR test results, this indicates that none of the
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TABLE 3 | Number and type of samples collected from the Barda region (2013–2014).
Collection period Location # of farms # of samples collected
Trachea Cloaca Environ Samples per location Total
23–24 May 2013 Live bird market N/A 15 15 0 30 104
Households in central Barda N/A 15 15 2 32
Zumurkhan village 5 20 20 2 42
26–27 September 2013 Live bird market N/A 10 10 0 20 108
Imamgulubeyli village 5 15 15 4 34
Chemenli village 8 26 26 2 54
23–25 October 2013 Live bird market N/A 18 18 7 43 163
Qara-Yusifli village 10 40 40 0 80
Bala-Qecher village 10 20 20 0 40
13–15 November 2013 Live bird market N/A 10 10 9 29 153
Qahramanli village 9 30 30 2 62
Shatirli village 10 30 30 2 62
18–20 December 2013 Live bird market N/A 16 16 8 40 100
Garana village 3 15 15 0 30
Guloglular village 5 15 15 0 30
27–29 January 2014 Live bird market N/A 20 20 8 48 90
Seyif Yusifli village 2 10 10 0 20
Hadjali village 3 11 11 0 22
14 March 2014 Live bird market N/A 0 0 30 30 30
16–19 March 2014 Ketelparaq village 3 18 18 0 36 252
Soganverdiler village 3 18 18 0 36
Muganli village 3 18 18 0 36
Kelenterli village 3 17 17 0 34
Qasimbeyli village 3 17 17 0 34
Alakadirli village 3 17 17 0 34
Live bird market N/A 0 0 42 42
19 April 2014 Live bird market N/A 0 0 30 30 30
Total 88 441 441 148 1,030 1,030
birds tested were actively infected. In the absence of clinical
evidence of a ND outbreak, it is likely that birds were exposed to
NDV antigen through vaccination rather than natural infection.
Further epizootological investigation conducted by the district
veterinarian concluded that the positive results detected were
likely the result of the vaccine administered a month before
sampling. Additional studies comparing the results of rRT-PCR
and serological assays on samples collected from the same birds
TABLE 4 | rRT-PCR screening results of pooled samples by collection
month.
Sampling
month and year
Number of
Pools
Newcastle
disease results
Influenza A matrix
gene results
May 2013 34 Negative Negative
September 2013 22 Negative Negative
October 2013 33 Negative Negative
November 2013 29 Negative Negative
December 2013 20 Negative Negative
January 2014 20 Negative Negative
March 2014 50 Negative Negative
April 2014 5 Negative Negative
Total 213
would help to establish rRT-PCR testing as a viable addition to
conventional serology testing to rule out active infections, or
as an alternative testing method to minimize false positive test
results.
Other studies have similarly applied both HI and rRT-PCR to
surveillance systems, using HI to detect seropositivity and using
rRT-PCR to detect active infections. A surveillance program
for H5 and H7 AIV in Poland used RT-PCR to investigate
active infections following a positive HI result (Pikula et al.,
2014). Out of 45,000 serum samples, nine geese or ducks were
positive for H5 or H7 on HI. When tested by RT-PCR, all were
negative. The conclusion of the authors was that a low pathogenic
AIV had previously infected some birds, but that there was no
actively circulating viral infections (Pikula et al., 2014). Another
surveillance program aimed at evaluating AIVs in waterfowl in
Spain identiﬁed 1.1 and 0.3% of birds seropositive for H5 and
H7. Of 47 samples that tested positive by both HI and ELISA, all
tested negative by rRT-PCR (Jurado-Tarifa et al., 2014). A study
using both HI and RT-PCR to investigate ND in caged birds
in Tehran, found that RT-PCR was more sensitive for detection
of active carriers than was the HI test when 35 of 335 tested
positive by RT-PCR but were not positive by HI (Madadgar et al.,
2013).
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There are several potential explanations for the lack of any
positive rRT-PCR results. First, there may be no AIV or NDV
circulating in the study area; this possibility is supported by
the absence of clinical evidence of disease caused by either
virus. Most birds in this study appeared healthy; only one farm
had one sick bird which tested negative for both AIV and
NDV. Alternatively, ﬂaws in the study design and execution
may have interfered with detection of positive samples, despite
eﬀorts to maximize the success of the project. For example, the
villages selected for the study may not have been conducive
to disease detection due to previous vaccination eﬀorts against
NDV. Excluding vaccinated birds from studies is problematic
because the vaccination status of individual birds may be
diﬃcult to ascertain. In a real-world setting, such as the live
bird market or a village farm, the owner of a given bird
may not be fully aware of its provenance, especially when
live birds are bought and sold in an uncontrolled market. In
the absence of a controlled study, future investigations could
consider two alternative research directions. One approach would
be to collect samples in isolated regions where no vaccinated
birds are known to exist. Alternatively, samples for rRT-PCR
testing and for serology testing could be collected from the
same bird. Birds that are positive by serology tests but negative
by rRT-PCR are likely to have been vaccinated; birds that
are positive by both assays are most likely infected, either
because they were not vaccinated or because the vaccine was
ineﬀective.
This project introduced environmental testing as a new
method to detect viral diseases that may be present at live bird
markets. Such environments can present an opportunity for
continued viral transmission as healthy birds come into contact
with birds that may be infected. Environmental testing is not
invasive, so it is more likely to be accepted by vendors concerned
about the adverse eﬀects that sampling could have on their
birds. Environmental sampling is also safer for veterinary health
oﬃcers, since it avoids the need to directly handle and sample
live birds. Although the utility of environmental testing could not
be veriﬁed in this study due to the lack of positive results, this
approach has been validated as a method for virus detection in
similar studies (Indriani et al., 2010).
This study demonstrated that swabs are a safe and easy way to
collect samples from live birds, and that environmental sampling
at live bird markets merits further consideration for inclusion
into the Azerbaijani surveillance program. Real-time RT-PCR
testing should also be considered as an addition or substitution to
the program, because it can be used to identify all inﬂuenza type
A viruses (including H7 and H9 viruses known to be pathogenic
to humans) and can help to rule out active infection of NDV in
birds testing falsely positive as a result of vaccination.
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